No Payne, No Gain?: Revisiting Victim Impact Statements After Twenty Years in Effect by Pitt, Damon
Chapman Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 12
2013
No Payne, No Gain?: Revisiting Victim Impact
Statements After Twenty Years in Effect
Damon Pitt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Damon Pitt, No Payne, No Gain?: Revisiting Victim Impact Statements After Twenty Years in Effect, 16 Chap. L. Rev. 457 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol16/iss2/12
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 10:15 PM 
 
475 
No Payne, No Gain?:  Revisiting Victim 
Impact Statements After Twenty Years in 
Effect 
Damon Pitt* 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-four years ago in Booth v. Maryland’s five-to-four decision,1 
Justice Scalia recognized a growing social and political movement, now 
commonly referred to as “victims’ rights.”2 Justice Scalia considered the 
movement a popular reaction to a perceived failure by courts properly to 
account for the damage that murderers caused not just to their victims, but 
to other innocent members of society, particularly victims’ families.3 In the 
majority opinion, however, the Supreme Court held that victim impact 
testimony at capital sentencing proceedings constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.4 Four years and two new 
Justices later, in Payne v. Tennessee,5 the Supreme Court overturned Booth, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate May 2013, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. Philosophy 2010, 
University of California, Los Angeles. Special thanks to my wife for her support, and to the Chapman 
Law Review members for their dedication to this Journal. Thank you also to Professors Marisa 
Cianciarulo and M. Katherine B. Darmer for their guidance in the Comment process. 
 1 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991). 
 2 Id. at 520 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact 
Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 260 (2003) (noting Justice Scalia’s recognition of 
the victims’ rights movement). 
 3 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that many citizens considered it 
“one-sided and hence unjust” that a “parade of witnesses” could “testify to the pressures beyond normal 
human experience that drove the defendant to commit his crime, with no one to lay before the 
sentencing authority the full reality of human suffering the defendant has produced”). 
 4 Id. at 502–03, 509 (majority opinion). Victim impact testimony, commonly referred to as a 
“victim’s impact statement,” is a “statement read into the record during sentencing to inform the judge 
or jury of the financial, physical, and psychological impact of the crime on the victim and the victim’s 
family.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (8th ed. 2004). At least thirty-three states admit victim 
impact statements at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Blume, supra note 2, at 267. The scope of 
victim impact statements range from state to state, each “ensur[ing] that a crime victim has the 
opportunity to be an active participant in at least some phases of the criminal case” and to “influence 
the way in which the defendant is treated.” Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The 
Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1991). For example, California requires that 
victims be heard, upon request, at any sentencing proceeding. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(8); see also § 
28(b)(10) (allowing victims to provide information to probation officials “conducting pre-sentencing 
investigations concerning the impact of the offense on the victim and the victim’s family and any 
sentencing recommendations before the sentencing of the defendant”). 
 5 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
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holding that the Eighth Amendment presented no per se bar to the 
admission of victim impact evidence.6 This time, Justice Scalia joined the 
majority in a six-to-three decision, and he again noted a “public sense of 
justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ 
movement.”7 In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens also acknowledged the 
movement but questioned the majority’s susceptibility to a politically 
appealing argument that had “no proper place in a reasoned judicial 
opinion.”8 
The Supreme Court’s sharp turn from Booth to Payne in only four 
years set the stage for a continuing debate over the role of victims’ rights in 
determining criminal sentences.9 What may have begun as a reactive social 
or political movement ultimately found its voice in the Supreme Court of 
the United States.10 The movement has transformed crime victims and their 
families from witnesses into participants at sentencing hearings, thus 
altering the constitutional analysis of victim impact evidence in criminal 
proceedings.11 
 
 6 Id. at 808, 827, 830 (emphasis in original). In 1987, the Booth majority included Justices 
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, 
O’Connor, and Scalia dissented. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 496–97. In 1989, the majority in S. Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (discussed below) 
again included Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, with White then concurring. 490 U.S. at 812 
(White, J., concurring) (“Unless Booth . . . is to be overruled, the judgment . . . must be affirmed.”). In 
Gathers, Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O’Connor and Scalia, again dissented. Id. Justice 
Kennedy, replacing Justice Powell in 1988, also dissented. Id. Thus, Justice White moved from the 
dissent in Booth to the majority concurrence in Gathers, while Justice Powell’s majority opinion in 
Booth was displaced by Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Gathers, maintaining the balance at 
five-to-four against victim impact testimony. See id. In 1990, Justice Souter succeeded Justice Brennan. 
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). In the six-to-three 
Payne decision in 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist now wrote for the majority, along with Justices White, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Payne, 501 U.S. at 810–11. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens dissented. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 7 Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 8 Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 9 See, e.g., Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims’ Rights: From Illusion to Reality, 
24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 9–11 (2009) (contending that law practitioners, local bar associations, and the ABA 
should continue to press governments to enforce victims’ rights); Andrew Ashworth, Restorative 
Justice, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 302 (Andrew von Hirsch & 
Andrew Ashworth eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1998) (noting the theory that crime does wrong to both the 
victim and the community). But see Joe Frankel, Comment, Payne, Victim Impact Statements, and 
Nearly Two Decades of Devolving Standards of Decency, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 87, 128 (2008) 
(“Victim impact statements have no place in capital decisions.”). 
 10 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827; id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Boland & Butler, supra 
note 9, at 5 (contending that the victims’ rights movement emerged from the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s in response to increased attention to crime and its effects). 
 11 Douglas Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 282, 283 (2003). Since Payne, “crime victims’ status in the criminal process has changed.” Id. at 
285. Victims are no longer “witnesses providing opinion evidence,” but rather participants in the 
criminal procedure with “state constitutional and statutory rights to give sentencing recommendations.” 
Id. “[A]ny constitutional challenge to victim sentencing recommendations” must now be made “against 
the constitutionality of participants recommending sentences, not as witnesses giving opinions.” Id. at 
283 (emphasis in original). Victims, however, do not have party status. See United States v. Rubin, 558 
F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 10:15 PM 
2013] No Payne, No Gain 477 
Part I of this Comment revisits Booth and South Carolina v. Gathers,12 
the Supreme Court decisions overruled by Payne, and draws particular 
attention to the conflicting philosophies among the Justices over the course 
of the three decisions. It focuses on how different Justices frame the issues 
surrounding victim impact testimony and the influence of victim impact 
testimony on juries. Part I also briefly looks at the rise of victims’ rights as 
a socio-political movement, a movement which has often caused intense 
discord between state legislatures and courts in the sentencing phases of 
capital cases.13 This tension seemingly culminated with the Supreme Court 
twice ruling against the movement,14 only to overturn both decisions 
shortly thereafter in what is now the law of the land.15 
Part II addresses the fallout from the Supreme Court’s about-face in 
Payne by surveying the empirical research conducted in the wake of the 
Payne decision and examining the competing philosophical concerns in 
relation to the statistical findings. This Part also surveys how states that 
allow for the death penalty have reacted to Payne, and dwells primarily on 
the effects of victim impact statements (“VIS”) on the rates of death 
sentences handed down in capital cases. 
After examining the fallout, Part II revisits the original philosophical 
tension embedded in the VIS decisions and questions whether Payne has 
impacted sentencing in the ways hoped for by proponents of VIS and 
feared by skeptics.16 The question again is whether the Court struck the 
right balance between the State’s interests in presenting to a jury the full 
impact of a killer’s actions and protecting against the danger of unfairly 
influencing the jury to rule with emotion rather than reason.17 This Part 
explores whether or not Payne adequately accounts for the indigent or 
unsavory victim with no family to speak on his or her behalf, and whether 
this problem is perhaps counterbalanced by the justice system’s competing 
desire to offset a defendant’s mitigating testimony.18 
 
 12 S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991). 
 13 See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
611 (2009) (addressing the tension between legal academia and the citizenry at large with regard to 
victims’ rights). 
 14 See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (affirming the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s decision 
excluding VIS offered by the prosecutor in his closing argument); see also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 507 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (rejecting the emotional 
distress of a victim’s family as “proper sentencing considerations in a capital case”). 
 15 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827; id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 16 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concern was that disallowing VIS “unfairly weighted the scales” in 
favor of the defendant, tipping the balance in a defendant’s favor and barring insight into the life that 
was taken. Id. at 822 (majority opinion). Justice Marshall, however, feared that admitting VIS created 
an “unacceptable risk of sentencing arbitrariness.” Id. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 17 See supra note 16. 
 18 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Cast aside today are those condemned 
to face society’s ultimate penalty. Tomorrow’s victims may be minorities, women, or the indigent.”); 
see also id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “all would recognize immediately that the 
evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible” if a defendant offered evidence about the immoral character 
of his victim, thus illustrating the inherent double standard for evidence offered about a victim’s good 
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Embedded in the Part II discussion is a survey of the competing 
arguments regarding whether VIS, if not closely safeguarded by courts, 
unfairly influences juries to arbitrarily recommend harsher sentences by 
placing harm to a victim’s loved ones above the harm committed against 
the State. Part II also explores whether, in the absence of character 
evidence presented to assert a victim’s good moral standing, juries fail in 
their role as the “conscience of the community.”19 By allowing 
consequences incidental to murder to determine the degree of the violation 
of the public trust, are juries tempted to give less regard to the inherent 
value of human life by considering the communal standing of the victim 
rather than the personal responsibility of the murderer? Does putting the 
victim’s character to the test degrade the victim by pandering to a jury’s 
sense of moral approval? Was Justice Powell justified in his concern that a 
jury’s decision to impose the death penalty would “turn on the perception 
that the victim was a sterling member of the community rather than 
someone of questionable character”?20 This Part puts these abstract 
questions in context by surveying the existing empirical research and 
statistical analyses to see what answers are given when tested by 
professionals in the field. 
Finally, Part III turns the focus from the debate over the merits of 
Payne to the continuing questions surrounding its implementation in 
criminal courtrooms. Part III examines several proposed safeguard 
measures intended not to overturn the decision, but to ensure that the use of 
VIS strikes the balance between protecting the “faceless” victim and 
preventing arbitrary and capricious sentences.21 Scholars have proposed 
several protective measures in recent years to be applied to lingering 
concerns about the effects of Payne in the courtroom, and Part III questions 
their continued need in light of a significant decline in death sentences over 
the past decade.22 With death sentences dropping by nearly two-thirds since 
 
qualities); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811 (limiting what a jury could consider when deciding to impose the 
death penalty to factors about which the defendant was aware, and not those that were “irrelevant to the 
decision to kill”) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505); Booth, 482 U.S. at 505 (noting the problem of a 
victim who leaves behind no family, and also the “danger of allowing juries” to consider information 
given by family members who may be “less articulate in describing their feelings even though their 
sense of loss is equally severe”). Justice Powell also highlighted the jury’s requirement in capital cases 
to make an “individualized determination” whether a defendant should be executed based on mitigating 
factors such as the “character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Id. at 502 (quoting 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (emphasis in original)). But see Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 
(reaffirming the State’s “legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the 
defendant is entitled to put in”) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)). 
 19 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504; Witherspoon v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
 20 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. 
 21 See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (“Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes the community 
from considering its loss in assessing punishment nor requires that the victim remain a faceless stranger 
at the penalty phase of a capital trial.”). But see Booth, 482 U.S. at 502–03 (addressing the risk of 
arbitrariness that VIS pose in capital cases). 
 22 Death Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2012) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION]; see also Capital Punishment, 
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1996,23 both proponents and critics of Payne might seek to re-examine their 
assumptions about the effects of VIS on juries.24 Has the State’s interest in 
balancing the scales adequately been weighed against the need to safeguard 
defendants from arbitrary sentencing? Has a defendant’s characterization in 
court become the determining factor in sentencing recommendations meted 
out by juries whose heartstrings have either been tugged too far or, 
conversely, ignored altogether? This Comment reflects on twenty years of 
VIS and explores their role in the current capital punishment debate. 
I.  THE FOUNDATION 
Any analysis of the Payne v. Tennessee decision requires a discussion 
of two previous Supreme Court decisions, both of which provide the 
foundation and context necessary to fully understand Payne. As this 
Comment illustrates, significant legal analysis has been dedicated to the 
following three cases and their collective impact on sentencing decisions. 
While much of the scholarship has included brief overviews of the cases as 
background for related issues, this Comment brings the opinions to the 
foreground, giving the philosophical underpinnings more attention than 
their conclusions. 
A. Booth v. Maryland 
In Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Constitution prohibits a jury from considering VIS during the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial.25 The defendant was convicted at trial on 
two counts of first-degree murder and the jury sentenced him to death.26 At 
trial, defense counsel moved to suppress VIS compiled from interviews of 
the victims’ family members on the ground that the information was “both 
irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital 
case violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”27 The 
 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ (select “Corrections;” then select “Capital 
Punishment”). 
 23 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION, supra note 22. The number of death sentences given in capital 
cases has dropped from 315 in 1996 to 112 in 2009, declining every year but two—1998 and 2002—
during that period. Id. In 2010, 104 new inmates were sentenced to death, perhaps illustrating a 
stabilization, though one that is statistically minimal. Id. 
 24 For example, Justice White assumed and expected that “[m]any if not most jurors . . . will look 
less favorably on a capital defendant when they appreciate the full extent of the harm he caused, 
including the harm to the victim’s family.” Booth, 482 U.S. at 516. A reasonable inference to draw from 
this assumption is that death sentences would increase rather than decline post-Payne. As the statistics 
show, this has not been the case, leaving open the question of Payne’s actual impact on death sentences 
overall. 
 25 Id. at 497. 
 26 Id. at 498, 501. Defendant robbed and murdered an elderly couple in their home. Id. at 497–98. 
The defendant was a neighbor of the victims and knew they could identify him. Id. at 498. The victims 
were bound, gagged, stabbed repeatedly, and their bodies were discovered two days later by the 
victims’ son. Id. 
 27 Id. at 500–01. The VIS consisted of interviews with the victims’ son, daughter, son-in-law, and 
granddaughter, all testifying to the victims’ “outstanding personal qualities,” the resulting emotional 
and personal problems suffered by the family members, and the likelihood that none of the family 
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trial court denied the motion and ruled that the jury could hear any 
evidence bearing on the sentencing decision.28 The trial court rejected the 
defense’s claim that VIS were “arbitrary factor[s]” added to the sentencing 
decision, holding instead that VIS serve an “important interest by 
informing the sentencer of the full measure of harm caused by the crime.”29 
The Supreme Court overturned the decision, noting that a jury’s 
“discretion to impose the death sentence must be ‘suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious 
action.’”30 The Court highlighted the jury’s requirement to “make an 
‘individualized determination’ whether the defendant in question should be 
executed, based on ‘the character of the individual and the circumstances of 
the crime.’”31 The Court has long recognized that in determining sentences, 
justice requires “that there be taken into account the circumstances of the 
offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”32 
Therefore, the Court further determined that the personal characteristics of 
the victims, the emotional impact of the crimes on the family, and the 
family members’ opinions and characterizations of the crime and defendant 
were “irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision,” creating an 
“unacceptable risk” that the information leads to unfairly prejudicial, 
arbitrary, or capricious sentences.33 
B. South Carolina v. Gathers 
Two years later in South Carolina v. Gathers,34 the Court again 
addressed the issue of statements admitted in a capital case concerning a 
 
would “ever be able to fully recover from [the] tragedy.” Id. at 499–500. 
 28 Id. at 501. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 502 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)). 
 31 Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (emphasis in original)); see 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249, 255–57 (1972) (holding that because the death penalty was 
unique among punishments, it was therefore different in kind and could not be imposed under 
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner, or in a manner allowing a jury to discriminate unfairly); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a 
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion 
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary or capricious 
action.”). 
 32 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 
(1937)); see also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 247 (1949)). The Court had feared that without the noted considerations in capital sentencing, the 
“system cannot function in a consistent and a rational manner.” Gregg at 189 (quoting the American 
Bar Association Project on Standards for Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 4.1(a), 
Commentary, p. 201 (App. Draft 1968). But see Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 435 (2007) (“[C]onsistency is implausible as an Eighth Amendment aspiration 
and . . . the Court has never seriously pursued consistency after Furman.”). 
 33 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502–03. 
 34 S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991). 
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victim’s personal characteristics.35 There, the jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct for his brutal 
physical and sexual assault of a mentally disabled man in a public park.36 
The prosecutor’s closing argument included remarks about the victim’s 
Christian beliefs, community involvement, and mental disability.37 Relying 
on Booth, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the prosecutor’s 
comments to the jury “unnecessary to . . . the circumstances of the 
crime.”38 The court therefore reversed Gathers’ death sentence and 
remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding.39 Upon granting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed its reasoning in Booth, holding 
again that the Eighth Amendment barred admission of victim impact 
evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial.40 The Gathers majority 
opinion was a mere six pages, essentially noting: (a) the distinction that the 
prosecutor offered the VIS in this case, while the victim’s family members 
did so in Booth; and (b) that the issue and reasoning in this case were 
otherwise “indistinguishable” from Booth.41 The dissent, however, was 
over twice as long—much of it would later constitute the bulk of the Payne 
majority opinion.42 
C. Payne v. Tennessee 
In 1991, just four years after Booth and two years after Gathers, the 
Court changed course, overturning both cases and holding that the Eighth 
Amendment permits the admission of victim impact evidence in capital 
cases.43 In Payne v. Tennessee, the jury convicted the defendant on two 
counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, and 
sentenced him to death.44 At trial, the defendant proffered several character 
 
 35 Id. at 811. 
 36 Id. at 807–08. The victim referred to himself as the “Reverend Minister” despite no religious 
training, and carried with him several bags of religious articles. Id. at 807. After beating and kicking the 
victim, the defendant smashed a bottle over his head, beat him again with an umbrella, and sodomized 
the victim with the same. Id. The defendant apparently returned to the scene sometime later and stabbed 
the victim with a knife. Id. 
 37 Id. at 808–10. The prosecutor also read aloud a religious tract entitled, “the Game Guy’s 
Prayer,” which used football and boxing metaphors to promote the virtues of being a good sport, team 
player, hardworking, and the like. Id. at 808–09. 
 38 Id. at 810 (quoting State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1988), aff'd sub nom. S. Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)). The Supreme 
Court of South Carolina concluded that the prosecutor “conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a 
death sentence because the victim was a religious person and a registered voter.” Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 811. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 812–25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991). 
 43 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
 44 Id. at 811. The defendant in Payne inflicted over eighty wounds on a mother in her home with 
a butcher knife, while stabbing her two-year-old in the chest, stomach, back, and head, killing both. Id. 
at 811–13. The surviving three-year-old son sustained stab wounds that “completely penetrated through 
his body from front to back,” yet he survived. Id. at 812. 
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witnesses to attest to his non-violent disposition.45 The State, in response, 
offered victim impact evidence pertaining to the defendant’s actions and 
their impact on the victims’ parents, grandparents, and surviving child.46 
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and the defendant 
appealed the admission of the VIS.47 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding 
that a misreading of its own precedent had “unfairly weighted the scales in 
a capital trial” by placing no limits on mitigating evidence offered by a 
defendant of his own circumstances, while not giving similar parity to 
testimony on behalf of victims.48 
Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the precedent as merely 
mandating that courts hear testimony offered about a defendant’s character 
as a mitigating factor, rather than as barring testimony of a victim’s 
character from the courtroom during sentencing.49 Because of the alleged 
misreading, he concluded, the State was “barred from either offering ‘a 
quick glimpse of the life’ which a defendant ‘chose to extinguish,’ or 
demonstrating the loss to the victim’s family and to society which has 
resulted from the defendant’s homicide.”50 With this in mind, and in 
consideration of the fact that both Booth and Gathers were “decided by the 
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic 
 
 45 Id. at 814 (bringing testimony in from defendant’s mother, father, girlfriend, and a clinical 
psychologist, all testifying to defendant’s caring nature, politeness, and low IQ). 
 46 Id. at 814–15 (focusing on the surviving son’s life without his mother, the traumatic effect of 
witnessing the murder of his mother and sister, and the opportunity for the jury to answer his 
subsequent question of “what type of justice” would be done for him—the implication being that the 
harsher the sentence the greater the justice done). 
 47 Id. at 816–17. 
 48 Id. at 822. Booth directed juries to “focus on the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human 
bein[g].’” Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991) (quoting Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Payne 
decision cited language from another Supreme Court case handed down the same day as Woodson, 
stating that “[s]o long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do 
not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions” on the evidence a jury may use 
“when it makes the sentencing decision.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 821 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 203–04 (1976)); see also S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 817 (1989), overruled by Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]his case illustrates the one-sided nature 
of the moral judgment that the Court’s broad reading of Booth would require of the capital sentencer.”). 
 49 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (“The language quoted from Woodson in the Booth opinion was not 
intended to describe a class of evidence that could not be received, but a class of evidence which must 
be received.” (emphasis in original)); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that 
“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (emphasis in original)). 
 50 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting)). Chief Justice Rehnquist added that the Booth court was wrong to state that victim 
impact evidence leads to the “arbitrary imposition of the death penalty,” particularly when considering 
the State’s “legitimate interest” in reminding a sentencer that the victim of a homicide is an individual 
representing a “unique loss to society” and to his family. Id. at 825; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 183 (1976) (noting that retribution is a valid penological goal of the death penalty); Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence 
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”). Thus, “one essential 
factor in determining the defendant’s culpability is the extent of the harm caused.” Gathers, 490 U.S. 
805 at 818 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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underpinnings of those decisions,” the Court reconsidered its decisions and 
overruled them, holding that they had been wrongly decided.51 
Justice Marshall issued a vigorous dissent focused on the fact that 
nothing justified abandoning Booth since neither the law nor the facts had 
changed significantly from one case to the next—only the personnel of the 
Court had.52 “Power, not reason,” he said, “is the new currency of this 
Court’s decisionmaking.”53 Justice Stevens’ dissent added that even if 
Booth and Gathers had never been decided, “today’s decision [in Payne] 
would represent a sharp break with past decisions” and would provide no 
support for the majority’s conclusion that “the prosecutor may introduce 
evidence that sheds no light on the defendant’s guilt or moral culpability, 
and thus serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor 
of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their 
reason.”54 Ultimately, Payne justified VIS in two ways: (a) by offsetting 
the defendant’s right to offer mitigating character evidence on his or her 
own behalf; and (b) by providing a jury with information enabling it to 
calculate the specific harm resulting from the crime.55 While VIS are not 
required, the Eighth Amendment provides no per se bar.56 Payne did not, 
however, depart from Booth and Gathers with regard to the admission of 
family members’ characterizations or opinions about the crime or the 
defendant.57 Any character testimony provided by a family member must 
 
 51 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828–30. Members of the Court had questioned both Booth and Gathers, 
and lower courts applied them inconsistently. Id. at 829–30; see Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 at 813 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 at 395–96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see 
also State v. Huertas, N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (1990) (Moyer, C.J., concurring) (“The fact that the majority 
and two dissenters in this case all interpret the opinions and footnotes in Booth and Gathers differently 
demonstrates the uncertainty of the law in this area.”). The Payne Court limited its holding to the 
holdings in Booth and Gathers, namely that “evidence and argument relating to the victim and the 
impact of the victim’s death on the victim’s family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.” 
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. (finding that since no evidence was admitted regarding the victim’s family 
members’ “characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate 
sentence,” the Court need not issue an opinion on whether such evidence would violate the Eighth 
Amendment). The Court further qualified its opinion, adding that “[i]n the event that evidence is 
introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Id. at 825. 
 52 Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 844–45. Marshall further opined that the reversal of Booth and Gathers “ominously” 
suggested that more Court precedent would be subject to “upheaval,” considering that the “implications 
of this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering.” Id. at 844–45. Marshall 
noted the Court’s “unmistakable course” toward “an even broader and more far-reaching assault upon 
this Court’s precedents.” Id. at 856. 
 54 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens goes on to say that “[e]vidence that serves no 
purpose other than to appeal to the sympathies or emotions of the jurors has never been considered 
admissible.” Id. at 856–57. While Justice Stevens does not cite any cases in that sentence to support his 
claim that Payne represents a “sharp break with past decisions,” he later references several cases to 
support the assertion, including Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); 
Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). Id. at 857–58. 
 55 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; see also Blume, supra note 2, at 266. 
 56 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
 57 Id. at 830 n.2 (emphasis added). But see Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 891 (Okla. Crim. 
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be limited to the victim or the specific emotional impact on the family 
member.58 
The Court responded to the main concerns raised by (a) the indigent 
victim with no family or loved ones to parade into court on his or her 
behalf during sentencing, and (b) the unsavory victim who presents to a 
jury very little reason to believe his or her death is worth rectifying in the 
first place: 
Payne echoes the concern voiced in Booth’s case that the admission of victim 
impact evidence permits a jury to find that defendants whose victims were assets 
to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims 
are perceived to be less worthy. As a general matter, however, victim impact 
evidence is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of this kind—for 
instance, that the killer of a hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death 
penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does not. It is designed to show 
instead each victim’s “uniqueness as an individual human being,” whatever the 
jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death might be.59 
The reasoning goes that if the defense can present character witnesses 
to testify on the convicted defendant’s behalf as mitigating factors to be 
considered in the determination of the sentence, then there is neither a 
public policy argument against nor a constitutional ban on the State’s right 
to present character witnesses on behalf of the victim as aggravating 
factors to be balanced in the sentencing calculus.60 If a capital defendant 
must be treated as a “uniquely individual human bein[g],”61 then so should 
the defendant’s victim. 
While Booth lasted four years and Gathers only two, Payne appears to 
be solidly entrenched as the law twenty years later.62 Though it may have 
 
App. 1997) (holding that a victim impact witness may offer an opinion regarding the appropriate 
sentence, but the case will then be subject to increased scrutiny upon appeal); Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 
199, 213–14 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (allowing victim impact witness to recommend what he considered 
an appropriate sentence so long as the testimony did not overly prejudice the jury and was not 
considered by the trial court when rendering the actual sentence); State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850, 863–
64 (Kan. 1995) (admitting victim impact testimony that was interpreted as “an emotional appeal to bias 
or prejudice” but was not “in any way” considered by the trial court when determining defendant’s 
sentence). 
 58 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2 (noting that the Payne holding is limited to the holdings in 
Booth and Gathers, as Booth held, “the admission of a victim’s family members’ characterizations and 
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence [still] violate[] the Eighth 
Amendment”). 
 59 Id. at 823 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 60 Id. at 826; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982); Skepper v. S. Carolina, 
476 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1988). 
 61 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Woodson v. N. 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 62 See Jeremy Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing: Reducing the Effect of 
Victim Impact Statements, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 110 (2009) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Affective 
Forecasting] (opining that the abolition of Payne is unlikely, as are VIS in some form); see also Bryan 
Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements: Implications for Capital 
Sentencing Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 492, 492–94 (2004); Wayne A. Logan, Through the 
Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 143, 177 (1999); José Felipé Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-
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settled the law, the fallout and subsequent academic debate is ongoing and 
varied. In fact, much of the debate has moved from lamenting or 
applauding the decision to investigating its impact and offering suggestions 
to prevent both victim anonymity and unfair jury prejudice.63 It is the 
evolution of this movement to which this Comment now turns. 
II.  THE FALLOUT 
Fallout from Payne has varied, with states essentially determining for 
themselves the extent to which parties may offer evidence and the forms 
VIS may take.64 The Court’s decision was a “major victory” for what had 
been at that time a ten-year-old movement to “empower victims in the 
criminal justice system.”65 The decision also further highlighted the 
ideological and philosophical divide that existed in the Court, which had 
 
Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 
28 RUTGERS L.J. 367, 430 (1997). 
 63 See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 62, at 110–11. 
 64 Blume, supra note 2, at 267–69. Blume, asserting that “Payne is not going away,” also notes 
that VIS are highly unregulated and politically popular, making it “difficult to imagine” that state or 
federal courts would limit their admissibility. Id. at 278. Blume further contends that the “increasing 
power” of the victims’ rights movement has resulted in nearly all death penalty jurisdictions now 
authorizing some form of VIS. Id. at 267; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim 
Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 312–13 (2003) 
(contending that after the Payne decision, each state was “left to decide for itself whether it would 
follow Booth and Gathers, or Payne,” and referring to VIS in capital cases as “routine” since the Payne 
decision); see also Pickren v. State, 500 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. 1998) (refusing to place “rigid limitations 
on the volume of [VIS]” while upholding the State’s admission of eight such statements in the 
sentencing hearing); People v. Gonzales, 673 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (refusing to place 
any limits on the number of witnesses offering VIS). For forms of VIS, see, for example, People v. 
Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105, 134 (Cal. 2008) (allowing a fourteen minute video with 118 photographs of the 
victims as part of VIS); People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 570 (Cal. 2007) (allowing a twenty minute video 
compilation of the victim’s life with music playing in the background); Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 
446–47 (Ark. 1998) (permitting the mother of three child murder victims to read a poem about her 
children to the jury); State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 358–59 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (allowing the 
victim’s sister to read a poem, and the victim’s mother to read from a laudatory diary she kept about her 
now-deceased daughter); see also State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (playing a 
videotape of a family Christmas-gathering); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 604 (Mo. 1997) (en 
banc) (displaying hand-crafted items made by the victim); State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1998) 
(allowing, in an extreme example of VIS, the jury to see a photograph of a dead fetus wearing clothes 
picked out by the mother, who was also killed, to be worn home from the hospital). 
 65 Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 427 (2003). Nadler & Rose recognized President Reagan’s Task Force on 
Victims of Crime, which issued a report concluding that there was a “serious imbalance” in the criminal 
system between defendants’ and victims’ rights to be heard. Id. (quoting PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982) (emphasis omitted)). Nadler & Rose contend that the 
momentum and influence of the victims’ rights movement, though controversial, intensified after 
Payne. Id.; see also John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights 
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2002) 
(calling the victims’ rights movement “one of the most successful civil liberties movements of recent 
times”); Susan Elizabeth Anitas, Note, The Status of Victim Impact Statements in Ohio Capital Offense 
Sentencing, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 238–39 (1996) (recognizing the controversial history of VIS during 
the capital sentencing phase and contending that Ohio passed its own Victims’ Rights Act in response 
to the “rise in victims’ rights awareness”). For a more recent analysis of VIS in state courts, including 
an enlightening history of the victims’ rights movement from its genesis in America, see Boland & 
Butler, supra note 9, at 6. 
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resulted in the reversal of two prior decisions in four years, and was 
exacerbated by the appointment of two new Justices in that time.66 The 
following section addresses the philosophical divide, raising again the 
question of whether a convicted murderer’s moral blameworthiness rests on 
the quality of the individual who was murdered, and exploring how this 
question has been examined through post-Payne empirical research. 
A. The Philosophical Divide 
The problem addressed in this Comment, while highlighting the 
philosophical underpinnings, rests on two public policy questions left open 
by the Payne decision67 when read in light of Booth and Gathers: Do VIS 
entice juries to recommend sentences in an arbitrary or capricious manner? 
If so, does the risk of creating “faceless” victims outweigh that concern? 
Legal academia has been “almost uniformly critical” of allowing VIS 
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.68 When presented on behalf 
of a victim, VIS are an attempt to force a jury to connect emotionally with 
the victim or victim’s family in a way that does not directly reflect 
blameworthiness in the same way a defendant’s character does.69 
Testimony on behalf of a defendant’s character is different in kind than 
testimony offered to ensure a victim’s treatment as a “uniquely individual 
human being.”70 The result is an emotional appeal to a jury’s sympathy for 
the victim based on extrinsic testimony of how “good” or “bad” of a person 
the victim happened to be. The jury’s role as the “conscience of the 
community”71 thus collapses, and a jury becomes little more than the 
conscience of the victim’s family. 
The reasoning posited is as follows: A defendant’s background and 
life-experience, including how he or she is perceived by peers, family, 
 
 66 Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 428–29; see also supra text accompanying note 6. 
 67 Blume, supra note 2, at 279. Blume explores several issues left open after Payne, one of which 
is the prosecution’s invitation to a jury to consider the value of the victim’s life (based on third-person 
impact testimony) when making sentencing determinations. Id.; see also Vivian Berger, Payne and 
Suffering: A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 46 (1992) 
(arguing that the intention of VIS is to invite “comparative judgments” of the victim’s life, as evidenced 
by the absence of a prosecutor’s focus “on the dead person’s vices”). 
 68 Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 320; see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim 
Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (1996); Berger, supra note 67, at 21–22; Markus 
Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 86–
87 (1993); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78 (1991); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 17, 18 (2000); Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital 
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517, 518 (2000); Logan, supra note 62, at 144–45. But see Paul Gewirtz, 
Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 863, 864–65 (1996). 
 69 See Nader & Rose, supra note 66, at 429; see also Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra 
note 62, at 109 (noting criticism by both courts and commentators that VIS has a tendency to bias 
capital jurors in favor of a death sentence and distract them from relevant evidence). 
 70 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1991) (quoting Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 71 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991); Witherspoon v. Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
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loved-ones, etc., are relevant in a criminal court because they help inform a 
jury as to why a defendant may have committed the crime or how social 
disadvantages (for example) may have resulted in a lack of moral fortitude. 
A defendant with a severely tumultuous upbringing may be less culpable 
than a person with no evident “excuse” for his or her conduct.72 Either way, 
evidence of the defendant’s character or past conduct speaks directly to the 
moral blameworthiness at the moment the crime is committed 
(notwithstanding intoxication, etc.); the blameworthiness rests on what a 
defendant internally brought to the criminal act, not on who ends up the 
victim of such depravity.73 Evidence of a particular defendant’s background 
is relevant, therefore, to offer a jury the opportunity to mitigate the 
impending sentence if justified under the given circumstances.74 
Chief Justice Rehnquist addresses this reasoning head-on in Payne, 
underlying the main thrust of the once-dissenting, now-majority 
philosophical attitude toward the admissibility of VIS: “Booth and Gathers 
were based on two premises: that evidence relating to a particular victim or 
to the harm that a capital defendant causes a victim’s family do not in 
general reflect on the defendant’s ‘blameworthiness,’ and that only 
evidence relating to ‘blameworthiness’ is relevant to the capital sentencing 
decision.”75 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, claims that the “assessment 
of harm caused by the defendant” is an important concern in criminal law, 
“both in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the 
appropriate punishment.”76 Noting the different natures of murder and 
attempted murder, he illustrates how “two equally blameworthy criminal 
defendants may be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts 
cause differing amounts of harm. . . . [M]oral guilt in both cases is 
identical, but . . . responsibility in the former is greater.”77 Moral 
culpability, therefore, rests on the actual consequences of the act, not 
merely the intention behind it. Permitting jurors to hear the full spectrum of 
resulting damage allows them to fully—and for Payne supporters, more 
accurately—assess and weigh the extent of the damage against any 
character evidence offered on the defendant’s behalf. The underlying 
 
 72 Society has “long held” the belief that “defendants who commit criminal acts that are 
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable 
than defendants who have no such excuse.” S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 817 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1982) (holding that the sentencer may not refuse, as a matter of law, any 
relevant mitigating factors including, in this case, evidence of the defendant’s age (sixteen-years-old), 
turbulent family history, physical abuse, and severe emotional disturbance). 
 73 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504–05. When a jury hears testimony that “may be wholly unrelated to 
the blameworthiness of a particular defendant,” this diverts the jury’s attention “away from the 
defendant’s background and record, and the circumstances of the crime.” Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Payne, 501 U.S. at 819. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (citation omitted). 
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theory is that a defendant cannot be judged properly without considering 
the full scope of the damage caused. 
In contrast, however, as many commentators contend,78 testimony 
lauding the character of a victim or detailing the emotional impact inflicted 
on each testifier forces a jury to first judge the victim. It follows that if a 
jury thinks the victim is worthy, it will hand down the harshest 
recommendation possible. If the victim is less sympathetic, or at least lacks 
a close network of loved ones willing to testify, the victim becomes the 
“faceless stranger” the Supreme Court seeks to protect.79 The jury 
ultimately judges the defendant based on its opinion of the victim, rather 
than on a rational independent determination of blameworthiness stemming 
from the criminal act. An assessment of the victim’s character promotes 
ethical-consequentialism,80 weighing on the one hand the “quality” of the 
victim, and on the other evidence of the defendant’s character prior to the 
act at issue.81 Thus, a defendant’s character is determined by factors over 
which he or she could not have had any control, rather than on factors for 
which the defendant is immediately responsible. This deep-rooted 
philosophical divide within the Supreme Court dominated all three 
opinions and their dissents, and set the stage for not only further debate, but 
for extensive empirical research to test the underlying assumptions. 
B. The Research 
In 2003, Cornell University held a symposium on victims and the 
death penalty.82  Several of the articles focused on the leading research 
testing how the inclusion of VIS would affect death penalty sentencing.83 
At that time there were four published studies exploring the effect 
information regarding victims had on “variables relevant to capital 
 
 78 See supra note 66. 
 79 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 80 Without triggering a thorough discussion of Kantian deontology or Jeremy Bentham’s 
consequential utilitarianism, the author intends this term to mean, roughly, judging the severity of a 
criminal act based on its consequences rather than the intentions of the criminal actor. Contrary to tort 
law, where a proceeding aims to make a victim whole, the criminal court is not similarly situated. 
“Ethical-consequentialism,” as envisioned here, suggests there is no difference in moral culpability 
between a murder and an attempted murder, where the perpetrators’ actions are otherwise identical; 
pointing a gun at a person and pulling the trigger with the intent to kill is the act that must be punished, 
not the resulting damage the bullet causes. To hold otherwise would reward the “failing” criminal 
whose aim is not as good as the “successful” one, but whose willingness to murder is no different. 
 81 See, e.g., Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 421–22 (noting the common concern that VIS 
“highlight the perceived relative worth of the victim,” and that the jury’s judgment will be influenced 
by this “inappropriate factor”); see also Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shall Not Kill Any Nice People: 
The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 105–06 
(1997). 
 82 Symposium, Victims and the Death Penalty: Inside and Outside the Courtroom, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 257 (2003). 
 83 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 2, at 257; Beloof, supra note 11, at 282; Eisenberg et al., supra 
note 64, passim; Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, passim. 
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 10:15 PM 
2013] No Payne, No Gain 489 
sentencing.”84 The first major study tested the hypothesis that the 
introduction of VIS would increase the number of subjects who voted for 
the death penalty.85 College students were given two different first-degree 
murder scenarios, with only half receiving VIS at the sentencing phase.86 
The study supported the hypothesis, finding that fifty-one percent of those 
who heard VIS elected a death sentence, while only twenty percent of those 
not hearing VIS elected death.87 
Edith Greene88 conducted two other studies following Payne, focused 
not on sentencing outcomes, but rather on VIS and its relation to a variety 
of “intermediate” variables.89 Her 1998 study played videotapes for 
participants during the mock sentencing phase, with one tape depicting the 
victims as a respectable elderly couple and the other showing them as less 
respectable.90 The study concluded that jurors who saw the tape about 
respectable victims “rated those victims as more likable, decent, and 
valuable; felt more compassion for the victims’ family; believed that the 
emotional impact of the murders on survivors was greater; and rated the 
crime as more serious.”91 Greene’s 1999 study supported the findings of 
her first study, reaffirming that subjects exposed to “high-respectability” 
conditions thought more highly of victims and rated the suffering of the 
victim’s survivors more highly than the subjects exposed to a low-
respectability condition.92 
In the same year as Greene’s 1999 study, a fourth leading study tended 
to support the conclusion that the admission of VIS would affect sentencing 
 
 84 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 317. 
 85 James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: 
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 9 (1995). 
 86 Id. at 7. The subjects consisted of ninety-nine undergraduate students at North Carolina State 
University, none of whom were vetted for any propensity for or against the death penalty. Id. Each read 
descriptions of two crimes, one with a “moderately aggravated murder” involving the shooting of an 
innocent bystander during a robbery (the facts were unclear as to whether the shooting was intentional), 
and the other depicting a “severely aggravated murder” where the defendant tied an elderly man to a 
chair during a robbery and stabbed him multiple times. Id. at 6–7. All students were told that the 
defendants were convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 7. Half in each group then read VIS modeled 
after Booth, which was used for both crimes and described “the reactions of the victim’s children and 
grandchildren to the victim’s death, their description of the qualities of the victim, as well as their 
opinions about a person who would commit such a murder.” Id. at 7. 
 87 Id. at 9. 
 88 Edith (Edie) Greene is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Colorado, Colorado 
Springs (UCCS), Director of the Graduate Concentration in Psychology and Law, and Director of the 
Psychology Honors Program. Edie Greene—Biographical Sketch, U. OF COLO., COLO. SPRINGS, 
http://www.uccs.edu/egreene/biographical-sketch.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 89 Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects on Jurors’ Judgments, 
5 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 331, 336–37 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, Many Guises]; Edith Greene, et al., 
Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases: Does the Victim’s Character Matter?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 145, 149–52 (1998) [hereinafter Greene, Character]. “Intermediate” variables, in this 
context, refers to the different ways subjects react to VIS without testing directly whether that reaction 
produces a tendency toward harsher punishment. Id. at 154–55. The “intermediate” variable is 
essentially the link between cognizing the VIS and making a sentencing recommendation. Id. at 155. 
 90 Greene, Character, supra note 89, at 150–51. 
 91 Id. at 154. 
 92 See Greene, Many Guises, supra note 89, at 345. 
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determinations, producing harsher penalties upon conviction.93 This study 
grouped 416 mock jurors into forty-eight juries and asked them to deliver a 
verdict on both guilt and sentencing.94 The authors of the study concluded 
that, consistent with the existing empirical research, “victim impact 
evidence . . . increased the likelihood that individual jurors would 
recommend the death penalty.”95 
Empirical studies conducted in the wake of Payne and up to the time 
of the Cornell symposium96 appeared to support the fears of arbitrary and 
capricious capital sentencing resulting from placing a victim’s quality of 
character at issue over a defendant’s criminal act.97 Two more studies in 
2003 reopened the discussion and challenged some of the assumptions 
underlying VIS and their impact on capital sentencing.98 While one study 
reinforced the theory that VIS would influence juries to recommend 
harsher sentences,99 the other claimed that this theory was not supported 
when tested on actual jurors who had served in real death penalty cases.100 
Both, however, suggested that perhaps not all forms of VIS produced the 
direct sentencing results that Justice Powell and others had feared.101 
Janice Nadler and Mary R. Rose102 tested the hypothesis that the 
“severity of emotional harm described by a victim in a criminal proceeding 
is directly related to the severity of the sentence imposed on the 
defendant.”103 Specifically, this study focused not on the effect of 
testimony from a victim’s family about the crime’s effect on them, but 
rather on how testimony regarding a victim’s own ability to cope with the 
effects of a crime would, in turn, determine the harshness of the 
 
 93 Bryan Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the Verdicts and 
Sentencing Judgments of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 95, 95 (1999). 
 94 Id. at 99–100. The study involved undergraduate students in a psychology course at Ohio 
University, who were divided into four groups. Id. at 99. Group one watched a videotaped version of a 
capital trial with strong evidence of guilt and admissible VIS; group two with strong evidence of guilt 
but no VIS; group three with VIS but weak evidence of guilt; group four with weak evidence and no 
VIS. Id. at 100. 
 95 Id. at 108. An interesting wrinkle in the discussion emerged, however, from this study; while 
“jurors who were exposed to the victim impact evidence tended to apply harsher sentences than jurors 
not exposed,” this tended to occur “only after deliberating with other jurors.” Id. The authors guessed 
that individual juror confidence as to the guilt determination increased during deliberations with other 
similarly-minded jurors, which in turn increased their confidence in their verdicts; “those who felt the 
defendant deserved the death penalty may have been more willing to express it.” Id. 
 96 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 317–19. 
 97 See, for example, the Supreme Court’s Booth and Gathers majority opinions, and Payne’s 
dissenting opinions, as noted and detailed exhaustively throughout this Comment. 
 98 See Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 431–32; Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 308. 
 99 See Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 434–35. 
 100 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 308. 
 101 Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 431–32. 
 102 While conducting their research, Janice Nadler was a Professor of Law at Northwestern 
University School of Law and a Research Fellow for the American Bar Foundation. Id. at 419 n.a1. 
Mary Rose was an Assistant Professor of Sociology and of Law, University of Texas at Austin, and a 
Research Fellow for the American Bar Foundation. Id. at 419 n.aa1. 
 103 Id. at 432. 
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sentence.104 Nadler and Rose tested participants’ reactions to reading about 
either a robbery or a burglary, and randomly assigned one of three different 
VIS within each crime.105 Two VIS described either “Severe Emotional 
Injury” or “Mild Emotional Injury”, while the third VIS was the Control 
condition, which contained “no information about how the victim was 
coping with the crime.”106 Participants were not told that there were 
different VIS; rather, “each participant read and made judgments about 
only one version of the crime.”107 The Control condition allowed for the 
comparison between the average sentence judgment when no VIS were 
present and the average sentence judgment when VIS were present.108 
The results confirmed the hypothesis that the “emotional severity of 
victim impact evidence influenced the severity of sentences imposed on 
defendants.”109 Participants, on average, chose longer prison terms when 
the VIS described Severe Emotional Injury.110 In addition, the study 
revealed that mock jurors experienced more intense feelings of sympathy 
when a victim suffered Severe Emotional Injury; however, there were “no 
significant differences” in the reported feelings of “disgust or anger” based 
on the severity of the VIS.111 Nadler and Rose concluded that “[t]hese data 
show that as the victim describes increasingly severe emotional harm, the 
sentence imposed on the defendant likewise increases.”112 Conversely, the 
defendant who “had the ‘luck’ of committing his crime on a victim who 
coped well benefitted from a shorter sentence” as compared even with the 
Control condition where the participant was given no information about the 
victim.113 These results reinforce the theory that jurors are “more punitive 
 
 104 Id. at 433–34. The study did not focus on capital murder, but rather on crimes where the victim 
lives, to ask “whether the emotional severity of victim impact evidence influenced the severity of 
sentences imposed on defendants,” i.e., whether sentencing would increase or decrease depending on 
how well a victim “handled” the experience psychologically. Id. at 435. 
 105 Three-hundred-and-two adults, varying “widely along various demographic features,” were 
given questionnaires during lunch hour in the lobby of a university administration building in 
downtown Chicago. Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 432–33. 
 106 Id. at 433–34. The Severe Emotional Injury statement stated that as a result of the crime the 
victim was then “afraid, vulnerable, depressed, [was] having problems sleeping, and [could not] stop 
thinking about the crime.” Id. at 433. The Mild Emotional Injury statement claimed the victim was 
“angry when the crime first happened, but now has returned to her normal activities and no longer 
thinks too much about the crime.” Id. at 433–34. 
 107 Id. at 433. 
 108 Id. at 434. 
 109 Id. at 435. 
 110 Id. For the burglary vignette, participants sentenced the defendant to 4.4 years versus 2.7 years, 
and in the robbery vignette the sentences were 4.8 years to 3.1 years, each with the longer term 
associating with Severe Emotional Injury and the shorter term correlating with Mild Emotional Injury. 
Id. 
 111 Id. at 435–36. Further, the percentage of participants rating the crime as “very serious” was 
much higher when VIS were Severe than when they were Mild, even though the average rating of crime 
seriousness did not differ significantly based on severity. Id. at 436. 
 112 Id. at 436 (“Even when all other circumstances . . . are held constant, the punishment is more 
severe when the victim is psychologically less able to deal with the crime in its aftermath.”). 
 113 Id. The troubling inference here is that when a jury learns the crime victim copes well with the 
effects of the crime, the defendant’s sentence is shorter, thus making the victim’s reaction to the crime 
the determining factor in judging the severity of a crime rather than the criminal’s actions or even 
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when the outcome of the crime reflects greater emotional harm to the 
victim.”114 
A second symposium study, while acknowledging that very little 
research existed, criticized the existing empirical studies as having “often-
rehearsed limitations that stem primarily from a lack of verisimilitude.”115 
While the existing research might have suggested certain tendencies in 
human behavior, it relied on data gathered in simulation studies rather than 
practical application in actual capital cases.116 Eisenberg, Garvey, and 
Wells117 therefore surveyed interviews of over two hundred jurors who sat 
on capital trials in South Carolina between 1985 and 2001 to analyze the 
influence of VIS on death sentence recommendations.118 Several questions 
were posed to jurors that were “designed to assess” how VIS operated in 
that state, and to determine whether VIS affected sentencing outcomes in 
capital cases.119 
The results varied. While there was “some correlation between victim 
admirability and jurors’ perceived seriousness of the crime,” the study 
found no “significant relation between the introduction of VI[S] and 
sentencing outcomes.”120 According to the study, even though VIS led to 
“increased empathy for victims and their families,” it did “not appear to 
have been directed to, or to have had a direct and material effect on, 
sentencing outcomes.”121 These findings appeared to rebut earlier 
assumptions that increased VIS would result in increased rates of death 
penalties in capital cases.122 While the study supported previous research 
concluding that jurors do often personally view victims in a more favorable 
light after VIS, and therefore view the crime as more serious,123 it failed to 
show that these feelings translated to votes for the death penalty among real 
 
intention. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 307. 
 116 Id. at 307–08. While not expressly stated, the reasonable inference is that while mock-juror 
testimony might be helpful in pinpointing general reactions to hypothetical VIS, this data relies on a 
perhaps faulty assumption that hypothetical analysis will remain constant when jurors are actually faced 
with the real-life decision of whether to put another human being to death. 
 117 While conducting the research, Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Garvey were Professors of 
Law at Cornell Law School. Id. at 306 n.a1–aa1. Martin Wells was a Professor of Statistics at Cornell 
University and Elected Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell Law School. Id. at 306 n.aaa1. 
 118 Id. at 307. The sample included thirty-three cases resulting in death sentences and thirty cases 
resulting in life sentences, with a total number of 214 jurors and a data set containing over 750 
variables. Id. at 309–10. 
 119 Id. at 310–11. Questions included, for example: (1) how many of the victim’s loved ones 
testified during the sentencing phase; (2) who testified; (3) what they testified about; (4) how jurors 
reacted emotionally to the testimony; and (5) how important such testimony was in sentencing 
deliberations. Id. at 311. 
 120 Id. at 308. While jurors tended to discuss the victim’s suffering and reputation as presented by 
VIS during deliberations, they all but ignored recommendations by family members as to what sentence 
should be given. Id. at 313–16. 
 121 Id. at 316. 
 122 Id. at 316–19. 
 123 See supra notes 85–88, 89–92, 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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jurors tasked with making that ultimate and final determination.124  
Eisenberg and his associates ultimately conclude that the “modest effects” 
of VIS reflect real juries’ reliance on “salient facts” rather than their 
opinions of the victim when deciding whether to vote for the death penalty 
or a life sentence.125 Their findings thus call into question the role of the 
previous research that did not utilize actual jurors in real death penalty 
cases.126 
III.  MOVING FORWARD 
As noted previously in this Comment, the Payne decision will not 
likely be overturned in the near future, and VIS will remain commonplace 
in the sentencing stages of capital trials.127 As such, much of the recent 
literary focus has turned to finding means of “counteracting or reducing the 
influence of VIS on the capital jury.”128 Part III now turns its focus to 
recent proposals for states to consider when determining the role of 
victims’ rights in criminal cases. The Comment concludes with the author’s 
own suggestion for a possible approach to balancing the competing 
interests detailed in the foregoing sections. 
A. A Survey of Recent Proposals Illustrates How Different States 
Approach VIS 
Some scholars call for courts to narrow the scope of what is 
considered admissible information contained in VIS in order to “reduce the 
inherent arbitrariness of their effects,” and recommend they not be used at 
all in death penalty hearings.129 For example, until 1999, Maryland limited 
victim impact testimony to written form and barred live testimony.130 
While Maryland now allows live testimony under oath by a victim or 
victim representative,131 the content of the testimony is subject to cross-
 
 124 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 340 (noting that none of the data studied “generate[d] 
evidence that victim admirability affects South Carolina sentencing outcomes”). 
 125 Id. at 341. The study challenges the idea that the use of VIS since 1991 made it easier to obtain 
death sentences; if that were so, post-1991 death sentence rates should have increased. Id. at 340. 
However, “[they] observe[d] no such increase and believe that this evidence supports the 
straightforward interpretation . . . that VI[S] ha[ve] a modest effect, if any, on sentencing outcomes.” Id. 
 126 Id. at 307. Eisenberg et al., however, recognized some possible limitations in their research, 
namely (a) “erroneous recall,” and (b) a “possible lack of candor” by some interviewees. Id. at 311. 
Since jurors were interviewed sometime after their sentencing votes, they could have tailored their 
answers to fit their vote. Id. at 339. 
 127 See supra notes 62, 64. 
 128 Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 62, at 110–11; see also Nadler & Rose, supra 
note 65, at 452 (contending that “the political reality is that the use of victim impact statements in 
criminal trials is not likely to disappear entirely, at least not in the foreseeable future,” and noting that 
“the victims’ rights movement is already politically powerful and continues to gain momentum”). 
 129 Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 452–53. Nadler and Rose focus on their concern that Payne 
places “virtually no limits” on the scope of VIS, and caution against overly-broad use, but fall short of 
offering more detailed solutions beyond simply “narrowing” the scope. Id. at 453. 
 130 MD. CODE ANN., Art. 41, § 4-609(d) (West 1997) (repealed 1999). 
 131 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-403(b) (West 2012). 
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examination by defense counsel.132 Another scholar suggests incorporating 
“credible expert testimony”133 at the sentencing stage to explain how 
individuals often “overestimate the emotional impact” traumatic events 
have on their lives.134 The purpose would be to remind jurors of the 
tendency to overreact to emotionally wrenching testimony and to consider 
the consequences of irrationally or arbitrarily voting for a death sentence.135 
Such a suggestion, however, faces serious obstacles when applied in an 
actual capital sentencing situation; jurors may bristle at being told that the 
death penalty is merely an overreaction to a brutal homicide.136 This 
problem gains even more traction considering capital jurors are often vetted 
by prosecutors for their willingness to impose the death penalty.137 
Other suggestions include prior judicial approval of VIS, restrictions 
on who can present the testimony in court, and restrictions on the number 
of those who may testify.138 New Jersey, for example, provided all three 
safeguards prior to abolishing the death penalty in 2007,139 having limited 
VIS to a statement by only a single family member, subject to judicial 
approval.140 California allows only “the next of kin if the victim has died,” 
but allows them to appear personally and to “reasonably express . . . their 
views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for 
restitution.”141 Once admitted into evidence, however, a court may require 
 
 132 Id. § 11-403(c). 
 133 See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 62, at 125. 
 134 Id. at 112–13. 
 135 Id. at 112–13, 115. Blumenthal’s study supported the theory that VIS “increased the likelihood 
that mock jurors would impose a death sentence,” but suggested that “the presence of expert testimony 
about affective forecasting tended to ameliorate that effect” and may help eliminate any resulting bias. 
Id. at 120. 
 136 Id. at 112 n.34. Blumenthal originally suggested several ways of conveying such information 
including “defense counsel argument, cross-examination of family members giving VIS, judicial 
instruction, or expert testimony.” Id.; Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of 
Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 192 (2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions]. 
He conceded, however, that expert testimony was the most feasible of the group due to fact that most 
attorneys would not seriously consider the prospect of cross-examining a murder victim’s family 
member on the status of his or her character. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions, supra note 136, at 
192. 
 137 See Witherspoon v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 519–20 (1968) (expressing the concern that 
juries do not accurately reflect a full range of community values when prosecutors dismiss potential 
jury members based on their views of capital punishment: “Culled of all who harbor doubts about the 
wisdom of capital punishment—of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty—such 
a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority”). 
 138 State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996) (holding that VIS must be subject to these 
procedural requirements prior to entering evidence). 
 139 Press Release, State of N.J., Office of the Governor, Governor Corzine Signs Legislation 
Eliminating Death Penalty in N.J. (Dec. 17, 2007); Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New 
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html. 
 140 Id. 
 141 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West 2004). The court “shall consider the statements” when 
determining the sentence, and this statute may not be amended by the Legislature unless passed in each 
house by a two-thirds margin, or by plebiscite. Id. 
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the victim’s family member to attend the “mitigation/aggravation phase of 
the hearing for the purposes of cross-examination.”142 
A different approach suggests that, rather than try to overturn Payne, 
states may simply impose their own prohibitions against VIS under the 
doctrine of “evolving standards of decency,” which the Supreme Court uses 
to distinguish between “right expanding and right constricting” 
precedent.143 Since Payne poses no per se bar against VIS, it does not 
create a constitutional right and may therefore be narrowed or eliminated 
by state statute.144 Indiana, for example, limits VIS to only relevant 
information pertaining to mitigating and aggravating factors.145 Mississippi 
remains consistent with Payne in that the state poses no per se bar on VIS, 
but it restricts evidence to that which is relevant to establishing aggravating 
(as well as mitigating) circumstances.146 Other states, like Wyoming, reject 
the reasoning behind Payne outright, making its general victim impact 
statute inapplicable in capital cases.147 
In contrast, many other commentators suggest that the Court struck the 
appropriate balance between competing interests, and VIS properly ensure 
that juries weigh the victim’s individuality against the defendant’s 
individualized sentencing determination.148 Others even call for further and 
more consistent expansion of victims’ rights in all stages of trial.149 With 
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 (“CVRA”),150 crime victims now 
have a codified federal right to receive timely notice of upcoming 
proceedings, the right not to be excluded from public proceedings, and the 
right to be heard at those proceedings within reason.151 Some scholars laud 
the CVRA as evidence that “the public consensus is right and the law 
professors are wrong.”152 This claim is bolstered further by the adoption of 
 
 142 CAL. ST. B. P. R. 5.107(B). 
 143 See Frankel, supra note 9, at 126–28. Frankel contends that contrary to sound reasoning, “the 
Payne Court used a devolving standards argument to expand the pool of those that [sic] might be 
executed.” Id. at 127. For more on the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine, see Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 144 Frankel, supra note 9, at 126–28. 
 145 Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 848 (Ind. 1996). 
 146 Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269, 275 (Miss. 1997). 
 147 Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 594–95 (Wyo. 2003). 
 148 See generally Boland & Butler, supra note 9, at 8–9, 11 (contending that state victim impact 
statutes should align themselves with the provisions of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, which 
include the “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court”). 
 149 Cf. Megan A. Mullett, Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory Opportunities 
for Survivors in Capital Cases, 86 IND. L.J. 1617, 1617–19 (2011) (arguing that the “haphazard and 
inconsistent manner” in which crime victims are allowed to participate fails both federal and state 
victims’ rights statutes by “re-victimizing survivors through exclusion and silencing,” and proposing 
ways of avoiding exclusion based on due process concerns in order to maximize victim participation). 
 150 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2011). 
 151 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2–4) (2011). 
 152 Cassell, supra note 13, at 611 (contending that legal academics have given no support to what 
is already a “near-universal feature of criminal sentencing,” and that VIS have “received such 
widespread support because they promote justice without interfering with any legitimate interests of 
criminal defendants”). 
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the CVRA in federal cases and the fact that some form of VIS exist in 
“virtually all state sentencings.”153 Whether for or against the admission of 
VIS, this Comment illustrates how state legislatures, the courts, and legal 
scholars continue to address the Payne decision, now twenty years old. 
With that in mind, this author offers yet another suggestion. 
B. Allowing But Limiting VIS Strikes the Right Balance Between 
Competing Interests 
This Comment addresses two primary competing interests concerning 
VIS: (a) the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing if used; and (b) the 
risk of creating faceless victims if not used. While research generally 
suggests that VIS do contribute to harsher sentences in criminal cases,154 
decreasing overall death penalty rates suggest they have not had a 
substantial effect on death sentences on a large scale.155 This observation, 
however, says nothing about the reality of VIS in an individual case. When 
one jury convicts one defendant of capital murder, what impact, if any, will 
the admission of VIS have on that defendant’s life? This is the moment 
Payne matters most, and it is the reason this author revisits the underlying 
philosophies behind it. 
The problem of victim anonymity in capital cases is serious. The 
Supreme Court’s argument that a victim has as much of a right as a 
defendant to be presented as a “uniquely individual human being” is 
compelling.156 This author is not convinced, however, that unbridled 
admission of VIS is the solution. The risk of unfair prejudice is as great 
during the sentencing phase as it is during the guilt or innocence phase. If 
not restricted in some way, VIS do not merely balance the scale by 
“counteracting the mitigating evidence,”157 but rather they tip the scale the 
other way, as the leading empirical research illustrates.158 However, as 
noted in this Comment, Payne will not likely be overturned in the near 
future.159 In addition, VIS remain politically popular enough that state 
legislatures will maintain their viability. But what still drives the VIS 
discussion is that Payne gives no instruction for their implementation. As 
such, the Supreme Court may one day soon have to decide what forms VIS 
may or may not take. The balance between the competing interests will 
likely be at the heart of that decision. 
 
 153 Id. 
 154 See supra notes 93, 99. 
 155 See supra Part II.B. The author does not suggest that death sentence rates are directly linked to 
VIS. There are myriad factors contributing to the national attitude toward the death penalty. The point, 
rather, is that death sentence rates have gone down since the Payne decision, which suggests that Payne 
alone did not open the door to more death sentences. 
 156 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822–23; Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), 
overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
 157 Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). 
 158 See supra Section II.B. 
 159 See supra notes 62, 64. 
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With that “balance” in mind, this author suggests a “proportionality 
test,” which would limit the admissibility of VIS only to cases where a 
defendant offers others’ testimony on his or her own behalf as a mitigating 
factor. Even in those circumstances, VIS should be limited, at the court’s 
discretion, to an extent proportional to the defendant’s proffered testimony. 
In other words, the Payne rationale is respected by allowing VIS, but the 
fears highlighted in Booth and Gathers are safeguarded by promoting 
balance. If a defendant chooses not to offer mitigating testimony, this 
lessens the need to counterbalance it with VIS. Victim anonymity may still 
persist in murder cases, but not as a result of the defendant’s mitigating 
evidence. Further, when a defendant does offer mitigating testimony, VIS 
still could be admitted to counterbalance the testimony, but not to 
overpower it with a parade of horribles. A court may consider factors such 
as (a) the number of people admitted to testify on the defendant’s behalf, 
(b) the nature of the testimony offered,160 and (c) the physical form of the 
evidence.161 The defendant, in a sense, sets the stage for the VIS—whatever 
the defendant offers, the victim’s loved ones can counter-offer, 
proportionally. 
Imagine a case where defense counsel for a convicted murderer 
presents the defendant’s single working parent, who offers testimony that 
the defendant was a troubled youth who never had a fair opportunity to 
succeed in life due to hardship. The parent bolsters the testimony with a 
handwritten poem by the defendant as a child describing how, one day, he 
or she wanted to be a schoolteacher. This type of testimony unquestionably 
humanizes the defendant and aids in an individualized determination of his 
or her fate. It is difficult to argue, however, that a murder victim’s parent 
ought to be denied the opportunity to tell a similar story on behalf of a 
murdered son or daughter. Allowing a proportional response meets the 
burden of finding an appropriate balance. A defendant who benefits from 
having family members willing to testify at trial may decide to offer their 
testimony as a mitigating factor. But, under the proportionality test, the 
understanding that a victim’s family may provide a response would temper 
that decision and prevent a tipping of the scales in favor of one over the 
other. In addition, where a defendant offers no favorable character 
testimony, the proportionality test also would bar a victim’s family from 
offering testimony, thus keeping the scales balanced. This approach would 
 
 160 “Nature” is intended to reference the content of the testimony. Testimony could include 
anecdotes about a defendant’s childhood, a list of good deeds the defendant performed, or an 
explanation of unfortunate events in a defendant’s life that may have contributed to poor judgment or 
susceptibility to violent behavior. The point is that depending on the offered testimony, a prosecutor 
could tailor the admission of VIS to respond in kind to the defendant’s offering. 
 161 Considering the various forms of VIS illustrated in this Comment, a court might allow physical 
exhibits in VIS only when the defendant offers physical exhibits, etc. in order to promote consistency in 
what a jury perceives in court. Courts may also, and likely will, place restrictions on what types of 
physical exhibits parties may present in order to avoid the most extreme examples noted in this 
Comment. 
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aid in protecting an indigent defendant from an arbitrary or capricious 
sentence at the hands of a jury overwhelmed by disproportionate VIS. 
Even the proposed “proportionality test,” however, fails to account for 
the indigent or unsavory victim with no family or loved ones to offer 
testimony. If a defendant exercises his or her constitutional right to offer 
mitigating testimony, a victim in this category still has no response. For 
example, prostitutes, victims involved in criminal activity, and certain 
subsets of homeless, mentally disabled, merely reclusive, or otherwise 
marginalized members of society will remain faceless victims in murder 
cases. While courts could offer jury instructions to mitigate any suggestive 
effect that an absence of VIS might create, they still open the door to a 
degrading judgment of the victim’s character as a determinative factor in 
punishing the defendant. As long as character testimony is offered at all in 
capital sentencing phases, this may be an unavoidable problem. 
Despite its inability to account for every variable, the “proportionality 
test” provides parity in several important ways: It (1) upholds a convicted 
defendant’s right to offer mitigating testimony on his or her own behalf; (2) 
lessens the risk of victim anonymity when a defendant offers mitigating 
evidence; (3) gives deference to the victims’ rights movement and its 
political force without abandoning the justice system’s interest in providing 
rational and consistent sentencing methods; (4) provides states that allow 
VIS a more structured framework for implementation; and (5) addresses 
the Supreme Court Justices’ philosophical divisions in a practical and 
balance-driven manner. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to determine the actual effect of VIS on juries, and even 
more difficult to determine Payne’s overall influence on the imposition of 
death sentences in general. While much of legal academia remains opposed 
to VIS,162 the political strength of the victims’ rights movement suggests 
the court of public opinion may have aligned itself indefinitely with the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Doing so adds yet another variable to 
the already complicated struggle to determine which of the two competing 
interests—the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing and the problem 
of victim anonymity—matters most. Exhaustive legal scholarship has 
speculated at great length on the reasoning behind the reversal of Booth and 
Gathers.163 Was it bad reasoning by a newly-stacked Court? Or, did the 
Court rightly overturn bad precedent in response to a shifting public view 
of the role of the criminal justice system? If the latter, has public opinion 
shifted again, considering drastic drops in death sentences across the 
country? Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this current 
inquiry. This Comment merely explores the competing philosophies and 
 
 162 See supra note 68. 
 163 See, e.g., Nadler & Rose, supra note 65, at 426–27. 
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suggests that a “proportionality test” may offer a solution for both sides. 
For a conversation on capital punishment that is bound to continue, 
however, it surely may be said that we cannot learn without Payne.164 
 
 
 164 Adapted from a quote attributed to Aristotle: “Learning is not child’s play; we cannot learn 
without pain.” See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 71–78 (H. Rackham trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
